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Introducing ClassCrits:
From Class Blindness to a Critical Legal
Analysis of Economic Inequality
ATHENA D. MUTUAt
In 2007, two workshops at the University at Buffalo
launched a project bringing together legal scholars interested
in exploring the relationship between law and economic
inequality.' The essays in this collection grew out of the
workshops and represent the project's first attempts to
think about law and economic inequality, a problem that is
growing locally, nationally, and internationally.2
t Athena D. Mutua is a Professor of Law at the University at Buffalo Law
School. I would like to thank the following people for their insights on earlier
versions of this Essay: Rebecca French, Kenneth Casebeer, Stuart Lazar,
Martha Mahoney, Martha McCluskey, Makau Mutua, Stephanie Phillips, and
John Schlegel.
1. The University at Buffalo Law faculty has been a rich source of critical
legal scholarship, including leadership in the original Critical Legal Studies
movement as well as in race and gender critique and also on issues of economic
class and labor. These include people such as James B. Atleson, Dianne Avery,
Guyora Binder, Lucinda M. Finley, Alfred S. Konesfsky, Elizabeth Mensch,
Teresa A. Miller, Frank W. Munger, Stephanie L. Phillips, Judy Scales-Trent,
John Henry Schlegel, Robert J. Steinfeld, and past faculty members including
Alan Freeman, Bob Gordon, Peter R. Pitegoff, et al.
I would also like to thank the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy for
sponsoring these workshops and being a leader in promoting cutting edge
scholarship. In this regard we would like to especially thank Lynn Mather, as
well as the former dean, R. Nils Olsen.
2. Between 1979 and 2005, the top five percent of American families saw
their real incomes increase eighty-one percent. Over the same period, the
lowest-income fifth saw their real incomes decline one percent. See U.S. Census
Bureau, Historical Income Tables-Families, Tbl.F-1: Income Limits for Each
Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Families (All Races): 1947 to 2007,
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In light of this growing reality, the ClassCrit project
aims to "foreground economics in progressive jurisprudence
and to reconsider longstanding assumptions and approaches
in legal scholarship and practice" around economic issues. 3
In particular, the project proposed to develop an alternative
to the predominant discussions of "law and economics"
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/f01AR.html (last visited Nov.
17, 2008).
The richest one percent of U.S. households now owns 34.3 percent of the
nation's private wealth, more than the combined wealth of the bottom ninety
percent. LAWRENCE MISCHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007,
at 251 tbl.5.1 (2007). The top one percent also owns 36.9 percent of all corporate
stock. Id. at 264 fig.5F.
Between 1979 and 2004, American workers raised their productivity sixty-
four percent, while their median hourly compensation rose only twelve percent.
See id. at 147 fig.3N.
Between 1949 and 1979, the inflation-adjusted average hourly wage for
production workers rose seventy-five percent, from $9.00 to $15.78. Id. at 119
tbl.3.3. Since 1979, the average production-worker wage has risen only two
percent, from $15.78 to $16.11. Id.
All of the income gains in 2005 went to the top ten percent of households,
while the bottom ninety percent of households saw income declines. LAWRENCE
MISHEL & JARED BERNSTEIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, RECENT INCOME GAINS
WENT TO THOSE WITH HIGHEST INCOME, Mar. 28, 2007, http://www.epi.org/
content.cfm/webfeatures-snapshots_20070328.
There is rising concern about economic inequality in the U.S. as the
following articles demonstrate. See, e.g., JANET YELLEN, PRESIDENT & C.E.O,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., SPEECH AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA CENTER
FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES
(Nov. 6, 2006), available at http://www.frbsf.org/news/speeches/2006/061106.pdf;
Greg Ip, Income-Inequality Gap Widens, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2007, at A2; Roger
Lowenstein, The Inequality Conundrum, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 10, 2007, at 11.
However, the last two article focus on income. They do not focus on wealth or
wages. There are also new books that are looking at these issues. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL J. THOMPSON, THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
IDEA OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2007); Bill Moyers, The Fight of Our
Lives, in INEQUALITY MATTERS: THE GROWING ECONOMIC DIVIDE IN AMERICA AND
ITS POISONOUS CONSEQUENCES (James Lardner & David Smith eds., 2005);
MOBILITY AND INEQUALITY: FRONTIERS OF RESEARCH IN SOCIOLOGY AND
ECONOMICS (Stephen Morgan et al. eds., 2006).
3. ClassCrits Workshop Call for Participation, Baldy Center for Law and
Social Justice, (Apr. 6, 2007), http://ClassCrits.wordpress.com/2007/04/06/
ClassCrits-workshop-call-for-participation.html. This posting contains the
original description of the ClassCrits concept.
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grounded in neoclassical economic theory and its denial of
"class."4
Historically, discussions of economic inequality often
have been discussions about class and the ways it is socially
produced and reproduced. However, today in modern
America, inequality is discussed as the natural byproduct of
the differing interests, talents, and education that
individuals bring to that mysterious thing political
economists and neo-classical economists alike refer to as the
"market."5 This "market," a complex system involving
millions of participants with its abstract features of supply
and demand,6 is also discussed as if it is a naturally
occurring phenomenon, like water, or oil, or trees, one that
is outside the control, creation, purview, activity, and even
4. Id.
5. I have placed the term "market" in quotes in this section of the paper to
highlight its contestability. That is, the market as currently discussed can be
seen as simply a sphere that is alienated from the larger economy. The larger
economy can be seen as a system through which "people cooperate to provide for
their daily and future needs combined with the techniques and materials at
their disposal." Sue Ferguson, Building on the Strengths of the Socialist
Feminist Tradition, 7 NEW POLITICS 26 (1999) (citing Pat Armstrong & Hugh
Armstrong, Beyond Sexless Class and Classless Sex: Towards Feminist
Marxism, in STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY: DEVELOPMENTS IN FEMINISM
(Caroline Andrew et al. eds., 2003)). The market, Ferguson suggests by contrast,
referring to it interchangeably as the market or the formal economy, is a "sphere
of exchange cut off from the acts of production/reproduction [that ground it and]
obscuren that reality... ." Id. at 4. She explains:
The domination of the market is unique to capitalism .... Rather than
understanding [it] as the historical and human organization it is,
political economists reify it, imbuing it with a dynamic (the laws of
supply and demand) apparently devoid of human relations. This is
what Marx identified as the fetishization of commodities and the
market, and his critique of political economy is, in fact, an effort at
defetishization-that is, an attempt to reveal the social reality behind
this narrowly construed economy.
Id.
6. The "market" is complex and because it includes millions of participants,
it is unwieldy and difficult to even influence, let alone control. However, unlike
water, its very formation and structure is built on past human action, and its
operation requires humans to participate, to agree upon its rules, to agree to
trade, or at least to acquiesce to its valuations, conditions, etc., functions that
may implicate law.
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influence of human agency. That is, the market seems
impervious to the desires, control, or influence of individuals,
governments, or whole segments of its participants.
7
Not seen, and more often not discussed, is the way that
individuals, groups, and governments do significantly
influence, if not control, the formation, organization, and
regulation of the market and the way these individuals,
groups, and governments are often organized by class. The
view of the market as natural is one of many ways that
social (classed) relations are obscured and society is blinded
to the challenges posed by economic power. Ultimately, the
questions of class and the roles of institutionalized
inequality continue to lurk beneath the surface of most
discussions of economics and economic inequality in legal
academia.8 This is so despite the fact that many legal
scholars are now interested in challenging or broadening
some of the reigning assumptions based in neoclassical
economics. The ClassCrit project hoped to aid this effort.9
The essays in this collection in many ways represent
three distinct strands of thinking, not yet integrated in any
systematic way and divergent in other ways. Nevertheless,
we hope they will provide various layers of insight into
7. This sentence is meant to convey two different ideas. One is that the
people do not need to intend to participate in or create a market to do so. In this
sense, if they simply trade in goods, or go along with the ways in which society
is already structured, they will in fact participate. They will have little choice,
generally, if they want to eat, have a home, and buy clothes. In this sense the
market can and does operate and reproduce itself without the active intention of
individuals or even groups. Further, because it includes so many people, a push
here may result in a pull there, nullifying the intentional push first initiated.
On the other hand, the "market" does not operate and reproduce without
humans and human activity. It is dependent on that activity, and as such can be
influenced by it. Further, humans acting in concert with others can and do
influence the "market" and decide its boundaries, application, and content.




thinking about law and economic inequality.10 These
distinct ways of thinking are influenced primarily by the
study of labor law as it relates to class, race law as it relates
to class, and gender law and class.
By way of background, however, this introduction
provides an overview of the workshops' key understandings
and discussions. It suggests that the insights these fields
provide, among others, are filtered through a lens of critical
legal scholarship that supplies certain understandings about
law, about the study of the economy, and about law's role in
structuring economic relations. These understandings, I
suggest, constitute a set of shared assumptions among the
group, and informed its rejection of class blindness,
understood, in part, as a blindness to the related existence
and use of economic power. I argue that feminist and critical
race scholars' critiques of gender and color blindness, in
particular, likely further informed the workshop participants'
rejection of class blindness and their intuition that class
blindness aids in perpetuating economic inequality.
Although the workshop groups did not conclusively
define class, I argue that they established the directions in
which the analysis might go. That is, they began the work of
framing a ClassCrit analysis. Such an analysis employs the
outlook and tools of critical thought, utilizes a relational
10. The two workshops each consisted of approximately twenty
participants drawn from the legal academy. Each participant submitted a three-
to-five page "thought-piece" in preparation for the workshop on the topic of law
and economic inequality. Many of the essays in this collection represent
expanded versions of these "thought-pieces." Not all of those who attended the
workshop have essays in this collection. Nevertheless their comments and
contributions may be noted in this introduction. The participants were: Frances
Ansley, University of Tennessee College of Law, Susan Carle, American
University Washington College of Law, Kenneth Casebeer, University of Miami
School of Law, Sumi Cho, DePaul University College of Law, Anthony Farley,
Boston College Law School, Martha Fineman, Emory Law School, James Gathii,
Albany Law School, Angela Harris, U.C. Berkeley School of Law, Laura Kessler,
University of Utah, S.J.Quinney College of Law, Martha Mahoney, University of
Miami School of Law, Audrey McFarlane, University of Baltimore School of Law,
Frank Munger, New York Law School, Jim Pope, Rutgers School of Law, Daria
Roithmayr, University of Southern California Law School, Donna Young, Albany
Law School, and many University at Buffalo Law School faculty members.
20081 863
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understanding of class and economic inequality, and applies
an intersectional approach.
One last note, the consideration of class relations at
the time of the discussions seemed a bit strange to some,
given that class analyses in the American legal context are
viewed as, at best, inapplicable, but in any event,
discredited. However, such a consideration now seems far
less preposterous, given the near collapse of the financial
markets" in the middle of the 2008 U.S. presidential election,
a collapse that revealed in full relief the privileges and
excesses of economic power.
Part I of this Essay argues that the workshop
participants possessed a number of shared understandings
that informed their rejection of a class-blind approach to the
study of law and economic inequality. Part II explores why
the organizers proposed that the group consider class
relations in its analysis of law and inequality and chronicles
a number of the key workshop discussions that, I suggest,
resulted in framing that analysis. This Part posits that a
ClassCrit examination of law and inequality employs a
critical perspective. Part III examines the meaning of a
relational understanding of class and economic inequality.
Part IV discusses an intersectional approach to this
analysis, suggesting that both an intersectional and
relational conception of class and economic inequality aid in
unraveling the blinding conflation of class and race. Part V
concludes this Introduction.
I. SOME SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS:
LAW, THE MARKET, AND CLASS BLINDNESS
The workshop brought together a small group of
scholars who reflected the organizers' interest in focusing on
economics through the lens of a range of critical legal
11. A collapse only avoided by huge governmental rescue plans, which
infused the world economy with "taxpayer" cash. See David Leonhardt, Perhaps,
Time to Play Offense, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al; Andy Serwer & Allan
Sloan, The Price of Greed, TIME, Sept. 29, 2008, at 32.
864 [Vol. 56
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scholarship movements, such as critical legal studies, 12
critical feminist theory, 13 critical race theory,14 LatCrit, 15
and queer theory.16 The group brought a number of shared
assumptions to the table. One was that law was important
in effecting, shaping, and structuring social relations,
including socio-economic relations, and that law did so
through the power of discourse-through cultural power-
12. For a discussion on the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, see,
e.g., CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Jones Boyle ed., 1992) and Mark Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991). See also THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kauris ed., 3d ed. 1998)
(providing a good overview of Critical Legal Studies themes).
13. For a discussion of critical feminist theory, see, e.g., Deborah L.
Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990). The literature in
this field is vast in part because feminist theory itself is a critical tradition. To
begin to get a grasp of field, see generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (1999); NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT VERCHICK, FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER (2006); JOSEPHINE DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY: THE
INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS (2000); CAROLE R. MCCANN & SEUNG-KYUNG KIM,
FEMINIST THEORY READER: LOCAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (2003); PATRICIA
HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (2000); REINA LEWIS, FEMINIST
POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A READER (2003); ADRIEN K. WING, CRITCAL RACE
FEMINISM: A READER (2003); GABRIELA F. ARREDONDO & NORMA KIAHN, CHICANA
FEMINISM: A CRITICAL READER (2003).
14. For a discussion of the development of critical race theory, see, e.g.,
Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race
Theory, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329 (2006). For basic themes and key early works
see, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION (2001); and CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller &
Kendall Thomas eds., 1995).
15. LatCrit literature is readily available at the LatCrit Web site. See
Latina and Latino Critical Theory, Inc., http://www.latcrit.org (last visited Nov.
24, 2008) (listing, inter alia, seventeen colloquia and symposia on LatCrit
among other work). See generally, THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998).
16. NIKKI SULLIVAN, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO QUEER THEORY (2003);
JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER (2004); MAx H. KIRSCH, QUEER THEORY AND
SOCIAL CHANGE (2000); LGBT STUDIES AND QUEER THEORY: NEW CONFLICTS,
COLLABORATIONS, AND CONTESTED TERRAIN (Karen E. Lovaas, John P. Elia &
Gust A. Yep eds., 2006); Laurie Rose Kepros, Queer Theory: Weed or Seed in the
Garden of Legal Theory?, 9 LAW & SEXUALITY REV. 279 (2000); Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
"Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society,
83 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1995).
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as much as it did through the threats and exercise of state
power and coercion. But the participants were critical of
this legal discourse, particularly its blindness to the
structural aspect of economic relations, the way these
structures shape various interests, and the role economic
privilege and power plays in shaping them. As such, they
brought a second set of assumptions questioning an economic
discourse that seemed to naturalize economic functions.
Further, these scholars likely shared understandings about
gender and color blindness that influenced their thinking
toward a class blind approach to their examination of law
and economic inequality.
A. Understandings of Law and Markets
As lawyers, the group shared assumptions and
understandings that not only led to a class analysis but a
critical legal analysis of economic inequality. Many of the
participants shared understandings that emanate from the
critical legal studies (CLS) movement. That is, they
understood law as not simply mediating between social and
economic conflicts but shaping, defining, and structuring
social groups-framing people's understandings, identity,
and actions-and the relations between them.
Further, the group understood that the outcomes law
produces are the product of political choices, albeit
constrained and often hidden choices. 17 These outcomes are
justified and legitimated by law, which also casts an air of
legitimacy over the institutions and systems of which law is
a part. It accomplishes this structuring, justifying, and
legitimating of its outcomes through deploying a "distinct
and elaborate discourse and body of knowledge," at times
perceived as scientific, but which constrains and masks the
inevitable political choices that influence any given decision,
a decision then "popularly perceived as objective and
apolitical," or fair.18 As such, law shapes and structures
economic and social outcomes, as much through the power
of discourse-through cultural power-as it does through




the threats and exercise of the state power and coercion that
backs it. The group was thus prone toward understanding
cultural power, discursive power, not simply as a reflection
of material circumstances as some Marxist analyses of law
suggest, but saw law as a force that helps to shape those
circumstances. In this sense, the group brought a critical
legal understanding to their analyses. They also brought to
their analyses the methodology of deconstruction; a
methodology honed in the critical legal studies movement,
which counsels digging into and behind the underlying
power relations to the hidden choices in policy decisions. 19
This view too, for instance, informed shared
understandings about the social rather than scientific
nature of the field and practices of economics. Here,
economics, typically conceptualized as human trade and
exchange-as the study of "markets"-is understood not as
a science as that word is typically understood, but as the
study of a social activity. Nor are "markets" some naturally
occurring phenomenon, like water, oil or the growth of trees,
outside the construction, regulation, and ordering of human
agency over time. The market is socially and historically
constructed. This is so no matter how many graphs,
mathematical equations and the like are employed to
represent it.20 Rather, subject to human agency, markets
and even for instance oil prices-supposedly reflecting the
market for oil, a natural resource-are the product, not just
of supply and demand in the abstract, but of concrete
political choices by groups of people, communities, etc.,
about production, distribution, and consumption. Even more
often, these choices reflect the interests and preferences of
19. Critical Legal Studies was in part grounded in a Marxist, or critical
Marxist, approach. Thus, though this methodology of revealing hidden choices
seems consistent with analyses counseled in Marxism, it was likely drawn from
it. See Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1049 (1978) (presenting an example of what appears to be a critical
Marxist approach in CLS).
20. Martha McCluskey, Thought Piece (undated) (unpublished
manuscript submitted to ClassCrits Workshop, Baldy Center for Law & Social
Policy) (on file with author).
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powerful groups frequently for their own sakes. 21 These
markets are organized and governed in part by law, a
system itself that lends an air of legitimacy to the
frequently hidden political choices that aid in constructing
and regulating these markets, as well as legitimating the
study of markets as something distinct from the people and
relations that produce them.
In addition, some of us were inclined to understand the
economy not as some reified notion of markets detached
from the household, civil society, or government, 22 but as a
system through which 'people co-operate to provide for
their daily and future needs, combined with the techniques
and materials [such as resources] at their disposal."'23 Such
21. So, for instance, our current continuing dependence on oil may best
reflect the interests of oil companies rather than the desires of the American
people. See, e.g., John M. Broder & Marjorie Connelly, Public Says Warming Is a
Problem, but Remains Split on Response, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at A20
(citing a survey that found "broad" support for alternative energy sources such
as ethanol or solar power to reduce dependence on oil).
22. This point about the reification of the market is important because
such reification of the market obscures the human activity, decision-making and
relations that underlie it. In this sense, reification performs a similar move that
law does. Law camouflages the ways in which legal decision-makers make
political choices even as their decisions are constrained by past human decisions
and activity and the reasoning they employ. Additionally this point is important
because in obscuring the underlying human relations it obscures the fact, as Sue
Ferguson makes clear, that the market is dependent on these underlying
relations in many forms and in particular is dependent on the home and
communities that reproduce labor daily and inter-generationally. Said
differently, the market does not produce the labor on which it depends, rather, it
must rely on families and communities to produce this. In this sense conceiving
of the economy as including households, communities/civil society, and
governments, and the reproduction of them both in their human and
institutional forms, rather than being just the "market," makes the concept of
the economy holistic and coherent. Further, while a reified market facilitates
the privileging of profit making, while obscuring the people that benefit from it
along with the decisions that facilitate that profit making, a holistic view of the
economy centers the goal of human sustainability. See Ferguson, supra note 5.
23. Id. (discussing the "social reproduction theory" and quoting
Armstrong & Armstrong, supra note 5). Ferguson in this article suggests two
primary goals and opportunities that social reproduction theory might provide.
First, it potentially explains the materialist foundations of patriarchy and
sexism. Here she suggests the theory implies that the division of labor arises
because communities of women and men share attempts to provide for their
sustenance and that of their children, building upon their different biological
2008] INTRODUCING CLASSCRITS 869
an understanding sees the economy as a historical
intergenerational human organization that includes
reproduction and production; and is larger than the
structures of trade and exchange in the market within it. 24
This understanding places people and their needs for
sustenance at the center of economic activity. It recognizes
reproductive capacities. I would argue here, that systems of domination did not
need to arise upon these divisions but they often did. Further, these labor
divisions are culturally and community organized such that different cultures
assign different rules to the sexes. For instance, part of the roles and duties
assigned to Masaai women in Kenya is that of thatching roofs, but thatching
roofs is decidedly a male role in the nearby ethnic group of the Kenyan Kikuyu.
See SAFEGUARDING THE GAINS FOR WOMEN UNDER THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION:
TRAINING MANUAL (Fed'n of Women Lawyers (Kenya), Inst. for Educ. and
Democracy, Kenya Human Rights Comm'n, & The League of Kenya Women
Voters eds., 2003).
Second, Ferguson suggests that social reproduction theory, if further
developed, might provide an "integrated" material theory of capitalism,
patriarchy and racism. She criticizes dual (or multiple) theory analysis of
racism, patriarchy, and capitalism, which understands these as separate
systems intersecting and shaping one another. Instead she argues that there is
one system, complicated, complex, and manifesting sometimes contradictory
impulses, but one system all the same.
I am not sure that the difference between an integrated theory and a
theory of multiple intersecting systems is of great consequence. For instance, I
tend to think of law as a semi-autonomous system within a single society and
system. For me it is not a great leap to think of patriarchy, racism, and
capitalism as separate systems with semi-autonomous dynamics within current
societies. There is something to be said, however, for an integrated theory which
suggests that, for instance, while patriarchy predates capitalism, capitalism re-
shaped this dynamic, separating male labor from the home, and rendering the
home a place for women's invisible and subordinated labor. In this sense
capitalism at its inception is both capitalistic and patriarchal. At the same time,
it seems to me that family and kinship relationships lay at the bottom of ethnic
communities which later group and regroup often by force to form ethnocentric
nation-like formations and that these predate "races." But capitalism, in part
creates "races" and racism based upon the coercive economic relations of slavery
and colonialism between these previously existing ethnocentric nation-like
formations (with different-looking human bodies) at the beginning of capitalism
and the Age of Europe. These conditions in part contribute to the development
of racism (both materially and culturally) and contribute to the racist, gendered
capitalist states that we see today. I believe that scholars such as bell hooks who
talk about the "white supremacist capitalist patriarchy" are seeking to convey
the idea that there is one system with various and sometimes contradictory
aspects. See BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RAcISM 78 (1995).
24. Ferguson, supra note 5.
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that people need sustenance to reproduce themselves daily
and intergenerationally and they need to labor (even in
trade) in order to provide that sustenance, without which
they can neither labor nor sustain themselves currently or
intergenerationally. It also makes clear that the market
does not produce the labor upon which it is dependent, even
though it shapes that process. It thereby brings to the fore
the necessity (and value) of household labor-feeding,
cleaning spaces that allow for rest and recreation, buying
groceries and clothing, people-care, etc., which often
becomes the second shift, too often relegated in both
ideology and practice to the work of women. Some workshop
participants were inclined toward this definition of the
economy because they also shared "insights into the
relationship between power and the construction of social
roles, as well as the unseen, largely invisible collection of
patterns and habits that make up patriarchy,25 given the
work they have done in the field of feminist legal theory.
B. Rejecting Gender Blindness, Colorblindness, and Class
Blindness?
The presence of scholars who specifically pursued work
in feminist and critical race legal theory informed the
discussions about an analysis of law and economic
inequality in a number of ways. 26 Specifically, however, the
work done in these fields on gender and color-blindness,
likely further informed the group's shared assumptions and
its intuition that class-blindness, including the use and
misuse of economic power and its relationship to other
economic formations in society, was a problem that in part
allowed the unchecked growth of economic inequality. This
is likely so because it can be argued that gender, color, and
class-blindness, though different structures, operate in a
number of similar ways, five of which stand out.
25. Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical
Examination of Recent Writings About Race, Crossroad, Directions, and a New
Critical Race Theory, 82 TEx. L. REV. 121, 123 (2003).
26. See infra Part III on intersectionality.
[Vol. 56870
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First, while ideas both of gender and color blindness
were developed initially to encourage equality, each of these
ideas has been practiced and interpreted in a way to render
law blind to the structured nature of inequality historically
constructed. In other words, gender, color, and class-
blindness encourage law and society, with law reflecting
and influencing society, 27 to ignore the various factors that
determine structure and shape the differences and
inequalities between women and men, people of color and
white people, and poor and affluent people, or more
precisely, those people with the economic power to direct
and manage large corporations. 28 Second, they reinforce and
recommend assimilation to the hidden and privileged norms
of maleness, whiteness, and wealth or middle-classness.
Third, they make efforts to redress inequality and
27. Here the idea is that law may or may not initially formulate a
statement encouraging blindness as the appropriate frame, but once blindness
is framed, the law generally through a neutral, sameness standard influences
and continues to shape the blindness frame. So for example, the color blindness
frame, in the modern era, may well have arisen from society and garnered
support from a reading of Martin Luther King's reference to the aspiration that
his kids might one day be judged by the content of their characters rather than
the color of their skin. But law has worked to cement that frame and further
define it in a way that allows courts and legislatures to ignore the ways in which
society has structured racial privilege and subordination in very observable ways,
such as in residential and, as a result, school segregation. Take for instance, the
majority's decision in Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
#1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2768-69 (2007), in which the Court carefully parses the
distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination as a basis for rejecting
the use of race as a remedy of past discrimination and thereby ignores the fact
that current school segregation is built on the continuation of past residential
segregation, as detailed in Justice Breyer's dissent. Note that this careful
parsing of de jure and de facto segregation is not matched by the equally careful
parsing of the distinctions between "odious" and "benign" discrimination.
28. Although I refer to this group as "affluent" or "wealthy," my focus is
really on those who control the wealth of the nation through, as Michael Zweig
notes, controlling the few thousand largest corporations. Michael Zweig,
Introduction: The Challenge of Working Class Studies, in WHAT'S CLASS GOT TO
Do WITH IT?: AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 5 (Michael
Zweig ed., 2004). He makes a distinction between the rich and those who control
industry and finance, explaining that when Vice President Cheney invited a
select group to help him formulate the U.S. energy policy he did not invite "rich"
people but those who controlled far more than their personal wealth. People
were invited because they controlled industries and such people only account for
about two percent of the U.S. labor force.
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subordination difficult because such efforts are made to
appear as if those so subordinated are getting something
extra or asking for something more than those who are
privileged, presumably because those who are privileged
already have whatever it is that the subordinated need or
are seeking. Fourth, when all else fails and the group
differences of inequality and subordination are noticed, this
inequality is then portrayed as natural, arising because of
choice, culture, or natural talent. Fifth, what are often
missing from these discussions are the power, privilege, and
actions of the privileged group.
Law, as part of the larger hegemonic order that both
reflects and influences structures around gender, race, and
class, currently facilitates this blindness through its
discourse and commitment to formal equality. Formal
equality not only renders law neutral as between individual
men and women, whites and blacks, etc., and treats them
the same in all cases even though they are not socially
situated the same, but also pretends that they are already
equal and have always been. This is in contradiction to a
commitment to a notion of substantive equality, which
would see the existing inequality and then try to bring
about actual equality. Law further facilitates this blindness
by focusing on the individual and ignoring the fact that in
the social context of gender, race, or class, that individuals
are harmed or privileged by virtue of their membership in
groups. Law does so even though privilege and power itself
is a group phenomenon institutionalized throughout the
economic, political, and social arenas and "is something an
individual can have only if society provides it."29
29. Athena D. Mutua, Theorizing Progressive Black Masculinities, in
PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES 16 (Athena D. Mutua ed., 2006). As Hannah
Arendt notes:
Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in
concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a
group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps
together. When we say of somebody that he is "in power" we actually
refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in
their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to
begin with.., disappears, "his power" also vanished.




Feminists have argued that gender blindness obscures
male privilege and power but also perpetuates it.30 First, it
does so by blinding society to the factors that determine
difference, inequality, and disadvantage between men and
women in the first place. For example, law generally takes a
gender-blind approach, counseling that gender is irrelevant
and should not be used as a factor to disadvantage (or
potentially advantage) women. This gender-blind approach
to equality calls for women and men to be treated the same.
In doing so however, society and law blind themselves to the
fact that in the workplace, for example, both law and society
have constructed an environment which centers men as the
ideal worker, by, for instance, initially and historically
limiting women's participation in wage labor,31 steering
women into separate, segmented, lower-paying jobs once
they were allowed into the wage labor force, and organizing
the workplace in a way that privileges workers without
responsibilities for providing care to dependents while
simultaneously relegating to women responsibility for such
dependent care. Such legal and social happenings produce
inequality that remains in effect and structures the
workplace of today. Ignoring gender therefore has the effect
of ignoring the factors of difference that structure and
determine inequality; thereby ignoring gendered inequality
itself. Thus when law, with its commitment to formal
equality, treats individual men and women the same,
ignoring gender and thus the way in which individuals are
socially gendered, structured, and situated differently and
unequally, it perpetuates the privilege of men and the
disadvantage of women. Second, when law is called upon to
30. See Tracy E. Higgins, Job Segregation, Gender Blindness, and
Employee Agency, 55 ME. L. REV. 241 (2003); Michael R. Evans, The Case for All-
Female Health Clubs: Creating a Compensatory Purpose Exception to State
Public Accommodation Laws, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 323-29 (1999);
Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equal, or Anti-Subordination?: The
Uneasy Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discrimination, 12 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1089 (1996).
31. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873)
(holding that Illinois had properly exercised power to bar married women from
the practice of law).
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address gender inequality as between women and men, it
often does so in reference to men, asking whether women
are the same as or different from men, reinforcing this
dominant and privileged norm and addressing best those
areas where women more closely approximate the standards
set by and embodied by men as well as standards based on
men, maleness, and/or dominant masculinity.32
Third, such standards and norms also force women to
assimilate, or to have the same needs that men have or to
engage in the same actions in which they engage. However,
when women have different needs, including the resources
or actions that would redress their disadvantage, these get
perceived as something extra because of course men do not
need them. In other words, this redress gets dressed-up as
special preferences. So for instance, when women demand
that social institutions provide them birth control, this gets
perceived as something extra that they are requesting both
because men are perceived and structured as not needing
birth control, but also because it often is already provided
for them. 33 Similarly, where women seek affirmative action
to ensure they are represented in various social institutions,
such as schools or high level jobs, this is perceived as a
special preference in part because men, already over-
represented in these spaces, do not need this policy. Fourth,
where inequality is frontally recognized, the law sometimes
notices gender and acknowledges the socially constructed
nature of this inequality but nonetheless often responds by
dressing this inequality up as a natural outcome of different
choices. So for instance in the case where women challenged
32. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscoURSES ON
LIFE AND LAw (1987), at ch. 2 (Difference and Dominance: On Sex
Discrimination) (discussing the sameness and difference approaches to sex
equality law, which, she argues, reinforces the male norm and male dominance,
and rarely addresses the most serious problems that confront women. She
advocates for a dominance approach. ).
33. Presumably both women and men require birth control when they are
sexually active but do not want to have children. But because society is
structured in a way that assigns childcare to women, women are perceived as
needing birth control and men are not. Also many insurance companies provide
coverage for Viagra, a medicine for men with erectile dysfunction, but do not
provide coverage to women to control their ability to give birth.
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the Sears company's practices of steering women into lower
paying jobs, the reviewing court understood the unequal
outcome as the product of women's choices-to be in lower
paying positions.34 And finally, fifth, when these discussions
focus on women, as they often do, then the actions, power
and privilege of men, particularly the actions of elite men,
are overlooked. This has begun to change.
35
2. Color Blindness
Similarly, critical race scholars have argued that
colorblindness, particularly in law, perpetuates the
racialized subordination of people of color while privileging
white people. They argue first that law does not merely
reflect and mediate pre-existing racialized social conflicts
and relations, but rather it constitutes, constructs and
produces races and race relations in a way that supports
white supremacy. 36 They drive home their point by
explaining that law historically produced race through
defining whiteness. So for example, "in order to perpetuate
a white state, judges defined whiteness through case law to
determine whether a Japanese man was white for purposes
of citizenship, whether a Chinese person was black or
Indian for the purpose of determining whether he could
testify against a white and whether Mexicans were white
34. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (hiring and promotion policy was not
discriminatory because women were not as interested in the higher-paid
commission sales positions due to competitive environment and because evening
hours would conflict with family obligations).
35. See, e.g., Scott Coltrane, Theorizing Masculinities in Contemporary
Social Science, in THEORIZING MASCULINITIES 39, 42 (Harry Brod & Michael
Kaufman eds., 1994) (discussing, among other things, the development of
Masculinities Studies based in part on feminist thinking).
36. Mutua, supra note 14, at 334.
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and thus entitled to serve on juries. 37 These laws
structured and produced races.
But then they suggest that color-blindness, adopted,
arguably, in part to redress racial oppression of past years,
nevertheless continues to perpetuate white privilege because
it counsels-even more strictly than gender blindness-that
racialized identity is largely irrelevant. 38 It then operates as
if a colorblind society already exists and has always existed
in the U.S. It thereby, ignores, cements and blinds itself to
the historical factors 'that determine, shape and continue to
structure the racial caste system that law and society
constructed in the first place.39 In other words,
colorblindness sees any racial classification as bad and
ignores the privilege often bought by whiteness and the
disadvantage often attached to blackness.4" The effect of
ignoring racial identity is that it allows society to also
37. Mutua, supra note 14, at 334, 359. See also Neil Gotanda, A Critique
of "Our Constitution is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); DELGADO &
STEFANCIC, supra note 14, at 21-22; MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING
RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR BLIND SOCIETY (2003); EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA,
RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2006).
38. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 201-02
(1995) (holding that racial classifications must be reviewed under the "strict
scrutiny" standard, whether imposed by federal, state, or local government and
noting that "[A]ll governmental action based on race-a group classification long
recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited-
should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right
to equal protection has not been infringed."). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (noting that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause ... that strict scrutiny
must take 'relevant differences' into account . .. that [n]ot every decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable," and thus allowing race to be taken
into consideration as a factor in admissions for the purposes of diversity in the
higher education context).
39. Mutua, supra note 14 at 335-36. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1768-69 (1993) (colorblind theory disconnects
notions of race from historical practice and meaning).
40. See generally THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING
AFRICAN-AMERICAN: How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 9 (2004) (noting that
despite presumed successes of civil rights movement and trend toward color-
blindness, "Similar achievements by people of similar abilities often do not yield
comparable results.").
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ignore the way that identity is socially structured and
positioned. So for example, blindness to the socially
structured construction of racial identities of workers in the
context of layoffs where people of color were the last hired
due to discrimination, and because they were the last hired,
were the first fired, perpetuates white privilege and
nonwhite disadvantage while appearing to be fair to all
workers.41 Again by being blind to the structural inequities
of racial privilege and disadvantage, and treating black and
white individuals (while the same as humans) as if they
were socially situated in the same way, the law perpetuates
the racial inequalities already in place and is blind to those
newly created. 42
Second, law's colorblindness does little to challenge the
hidden and privileged norm of whiteness, whether it is
dressed up in universalized standards of beauty, for
example, or merit. 43 In either case, treating people of color
the same as white, or rather, as if they were white,
reinforces whiteness and ignores the socially constructed
disadvantage inherent in the standards based on whiteness
(as in beauty) or white access historically structured (as in
merit for educational success based on access to "good
schools" in "safe neighborhoods" in the K-12 years). Third,
colorblindness also renders request to waive or redefine the
standards as well as demands to access resources, 44 which
would enable people of color to meet the standards, as
special preferences, in part because whites presumably
41. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (race-
based layoff clause in collective bargaining agreement violated Equal Protection
Clause).
42. Mutua, supra note 14, at 334. In fact I argue Supreme Court decisions
that operate in this way were meant to protect white people by claiming they
were innocent (lacking intent) at the expense of justice for black individuals. See
id. Finley makes a similar claim. Finley, supra note 30.
43. See Daria Roithmayr, Policy, Politics & Praxis: Deconstructing the
Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1450, 1452 (1997) ("[Mjerit
standards disproportionately exclude people of color and women because the
standards historically have been developed by members of dominant groups in
ways that end up favoring them.").
44. These resources might include such things as a good education, a
healthy educational and living environment, and resume-building opportunities.
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already have access to these resources, 45 and thus do not
need policies that provide them. Here, again affirmative
action in contracting is an example.46 Fourth, when the
subordination of nonwhite identity is noticed, as in
recognizing the disproportionate poverty among black
people, two things happen. One, society ignores the way in
which poverty has been racially structured over time; and
two, the disadvantages are explained away as the result of
cultural deficiencies, or dismissed, again particularly in law,
because some individual white person did not intentionally
cause them. 47 And finally, a focus on the actions and
conditions of people of color often lets off the hook the
actions and privileges of whites, particularly those in
positions of power. This too is beginning to change.48
3. Class Blindness?
In addition to the groups' familiarity with the work of
authors like Karl Klare, 49 as well as authors such as Angela
45. Except that some whites do not have access to these resources
because of their class; they are poor.
46. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (in
which the Supreme Court struck down a city plan that required city contracts to
subcontract thirty percent of the contract's value to businesses owned by
minorities. The plan was based upon findings that there was racial
discrimination in the industry, that minorities received less than one percent of
public contracting even though they constituted almost fifty percent of the
population, that there were almost no minority contractors in city and state
associations, and that a congressional study had found that past discrimination
had stifled minority participation in the construction industry nationally.)
Individualistic colorblindness apparently dictated that this history be ignored,
or that it was irrelevant, or that, in any event, it could not be remedied.
47. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (involving a
Georgia sentencing system in which the Supreme Court rejected the use of the
statistical reports to document discriminatory effect in the absence of proof of
intentional discrimination).
48. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Introduction, in CRITICAL
WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR xvii-xviii (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, 1997) on the development of critical white studies.
49. See, e.g., Karl Klare, The Horizons of Transformative Labour &
Employment Law, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION:
TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES & POSSIBILITIES 3, 3-29 (Karl Klare et al. eds.,
2002).
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Harris, 50 Martha Mahoney, 51 and Thomas Ross,52 among
others, who have challenged class blindness or its effects in
other ways, this work of unpacking the effects of gender and
color-blindness may well have helped fueled the workshop
group's intuition that class-blindness contributes to
economic inequality. Class-blindness operates and has
effects similar to those of gender and color-blindness, but it
is slightly more complicated at first blush,53 in part, because
the reigning ideology about class and economic difference
has been so successful.
So for starters, according to the dominant ideology,
class does not exist in the U.S. If class does not exist then
one certainly cannot see it. However, while class arguably
does not exist, economic differences do exist. These
economic differences, unlike gendered and racialized
differences, can be noticed, but are, nonetheless, irrelevant.
That is, gender-blindness and color-blindness counsel us not
to see gender or color and thereby allows us to ignore the
structured inequalities inherent in them, because these
differences are irrelevant and thus not appropriately
noticed or taken into account. However, with economic
differences, we can, should, and do see these differences,
these inequalities, at least to a point, and may in fact call
them "class," but they are, in any event, not relevant. Thus,
at first blush, class is complicated, involving at least three
issues that must be clarified before the rest of the analysis
can proceed. These three issues involve the questions: do
50. See, e.g., ANGELA P. HARRIS & EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN, ECONOMIC
JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS (2006); ANGELA P. HARRIS &
EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN, A WOMAN'S PLACE IS IN THE MARKETPLACE: GENDER AND
ECONOMICS (2006).
51. See infra discussion accompanying notes 89-103.
52. See, e.g., Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality,
Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991).
53. While there are differences between gender and color structures,
people often feel that there are significant differences between these and class
differences. First, class is not an "immutable" trait. While the idea of assigning
immutability to race and gender constructs is problematic because features of
these constructs change, class is clearly mutable and people can move from one
economic status to another. I do not address these here. My central point is that
the factors that shape and determine race, gender, or class are often ignored.
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we, in American society, see class?; which classes do we
see?; and, when we see them, are they relevant?54 Answers
to these are shaped by the dominant ideology.
Class is said not to exist in the U.S. and yet we often
talk, at least, about the middle class. Is not this a
recognition that class exists in the U.S.? The assertion that
class does not exist is a statement about the lack of
antagonism between classes as typically described by Marx
and others. In the U.S., so the dominant ideology tells us,
there is no structural tension between classes; we all work
together for the greater good. Thus, there is no issue of class
in the U.S. Further, our recognition of the middle class is
not the recognition of a class that is related to other classes
and thus might be in tension with them. It is the
recognition of economic differences, differences that we can
see but where, as the dominant ideology explains, "my
wealth is in no way related to your poverty," and thus our
relations are not antagonistic. These differences, instead,
are simply the results of naturally occurring variations,
variations that are the results of our different interests,
talents, and educational accomplishments. Class, thus, in
the U.S., is a status in the economic world.
Second, generally, we see very few classes in the U.S.
Generally we see and talk about the middle class and then
the poor. But the status of the poor, again, has little to do
with the wealth or comfort of the middle class; that is, the
claim is: there exists little to no structured impoverishment
that relates to structured privilege. Further, we talk only
infrequently about the working class, because as a practical
matter, the working class, an economic class that labors for
its survival and exercises little control over the workplace in
54. By "relevant" I mean to question whether financial power, standing,
or ability should be taken into account. Obviously these observations are general.
For instance, the way we organize the tax code takes into account economic
differences. However, as I attempt to demonstrate in my discussion of the 2008
presidential election, even the organization of the tax code has been challenged
by our dominant ideology. I thank Stuart Lazar for reminding me of this.
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modern America, 55 often sees itself as part of the middle
class. In addition, while the middle class largely works for
its survival and may exercise a little more control over their
working environments than do the working class, the
middle class not only houses the working class but also the
wealthy. The latter results because the wealthy often
appear in practice as the middle class and thus are rarely
seen or acknowledged as even existing. 56 However, when
they are seen, and seen as wealthy and possessing economic
power, the dominant ideology chastises us for noticing their
wealth (it is inappropriate) and accuses us of engaging in
"class warfare." 57 At the same time, this ideology informs us
that "the current economic arrangements [are] necessary
and natural," that "the maintenance and creation of the rich
are indispensable and beneficial to the rest of us," and "that
policies which put the well-being of the vast majority of
humanity at the center of economic ordering and
development are destructive."5 8 So for instance, the U.S.
government was quick to bail out Wall Street during the
2008 financial collapse but was initially reluctant to bail out
Main Street by restructuring homeowner mortgages even
though devaluations in the housing market on Main Street
seemed in part a root cause of the problems occurring on
55. See Erik Olin Wright, Foundations of a Neo-Marxist Class Analysis,
in APPROACHES TO CLASS ANALYSIS 4, 4-21 (Erik Olin Wright ed., 2005)
(discussing the different classes in America and in some ways describing the
working class in these terms).
56. See Michael Kimmel, Toward a Pedagogy of the Oppressor, in
PROGRESSIVE BLACK MASCULINITIES, supra note 29, at 63, 68 (discussing how the
wealthy often downplay their wealth and appear and act like the middle class
while the poor or working class dress toward their aspiration of middle or upper
class-ness).
57. So for example, some have accused President Obama of engaging in
class warfare in his campaign pledge to lower taxes for the middle class and
implicitly to raise taxes for the wealthy-those making over $250,000 in income.
But acts such as banks advocating for Congress to tighten the rules governing
the declaration of bankruptcy for everyday people (or workers) are rarely seen
as acts of class warfare. But see Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Middle Class, in
ENDING POVERTY IN AMERICA: How TO RESTORE THE AMERICAN DREAM 38 (John
Edwards, Marion Crain & Arne L. Kallberg eds., 2007).
58. Mutua, supra note 14, at 386-87.
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Wall Street.59 Further, not seeing the wealthy, whose
existence is presumed to be of benefit to us all, also results
in our not seeing the historically constructed advantages
that empower them, or their use of that power to create and
maintain for themselves these structural advantages. That
is, ignoring the class of people with economic power allows
us to ignore the structures that shape and determine their
wealth and power. Most of our conversations about class,
therefore, are about the middle class (encompassing the
wealthy, the middle class, and the working class) and then
the poor.
And, finally, the third clarifying question of whether
class is relevant, garners a response that repeats some of
the answers above, and then answers, particularly in law:
No. That is, economic differences are not relevant (we
should treat the poor the same as the middle class); and
even if they are relevant (we should do something about the
poor), your poverty is not related to my wealth and we
cannot do much about poverty, a complex problem,
anyway.60
This analysis, shaped by our dominant ideology, thus
proceeds: There is no class but there are economic
differences, and unlike gender and color blindness, we can
see these differences, differences between the middle class
and the poor (mostly). However, these differences are not
relevant, and thus can be ignored because one difference is
not related to any other difference, they are the product of
our different interests and talents, and in any event, cannot
be changed. Upon this basis, the rest of the perils of class
blindness then can proceed in much the same way as gender
and color blindness do: First, structural economic inequality
59. In popular culture, the financial sector was referred to as Wall Street
while the problems of average Americans were referred to as problems of Main
Street. The point here is that help to the affluent always seems forthcoming
because their welfare is viewed as vital to the country while the welfare of
average Americans-the working class perhaps-is at best secondary. Thus help
to them is viewed as debatable and ultimately destructive to the system.
Similar insights are garnered from an analysis of the assumption of "trickle-
down economic theory. See sources supra note 11.
60. See generally Ross, supra note 52.
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or the factors that determine, shape and cause economic
difference-wealth, financial comfort, or poverty-can be
ignored because not only are there no class relations but, by
definition, the factors that determine differences are the
product of our differing interests, talents, and education and
so are "natural." Thus there is no reason to treat anyone or
any group differently because of economic differences. In
fact we should treat them the same; that is we should treat
the poor like we treat the middle class in all cases and
presumably not disadvantage them (but neither provide
them the resources to in fact become middle class because
this would be an unfair advantage). 1  Second, this
comparison reinforces the norm of middle-classness,62 and
thus allows us to relegate both the middle class and the
poor to sleep under bridges or to evacuate a flooding city,
without recognizing that precisely because the middle class
are financially able, they will be able to forgo sleeping under
the bridge or will be able to evacuate the city while the poor
will not. And third, when the poor ask for resources to make
them like the middle class, they are perceived as asking for
special preferences-like welfare or jobs-a preference to
rectify a situation that they are not entitled to, according to
our dominant paradigm, because, fourth, when their
poverty is noticed, it is explained as resulting from lack of
talent or hard work, or even bad luck, but in any event is
61. San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that a Texas local
property tax system that financed public schools and resulted in fewer
educational resources for children residing in districts with lower property
values did not violate the equal protection clause). See Donald Judges, Bayonets
for the Wounded: Constitutional Paradigms and Disadvantaged Neighborhoods,
19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 604-05 (1992) (describing the Rodriguez case as
the " red Scott decision for the underclass"); JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALITIES 223-229 (1991) (describing the children attending the San Antonio
schools featured in the Rodriguez case as still poor and continuing to attend
separate and unequal schools twenty-three years after the decision). In future
work, I hope to write a socio-legal historical narrative about the development
and operation of class blindness. The narrative would center Supreme Court
cases and explore the Court's role over time in the development of the rights of
the corporation, the limits on workers' rights and the treatment of the poor.
62. The middle class is not so much hidden as it is normative. In fact the
middle class is very visible. What is hidden is what it includes and the ways in
which those classes that are included might be in conflict. And finally, if the
middle class is the norm and normal, what in the world is wrong with the poor?
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not related to anyone else's wealth and is a situation that is
difficult to change. Finally what is missing from this
analysis is a discussion of the wealthy class itself and the
power they exercise often on their own behalf to maintain
and structure that wealth; an analysis ClassCrits hopes to
provide.
The near collapse of the financial market and the
2008 presidential election, which focused on the status of
the economy, is an example of how part of this thinking
works. The financial market collapse began to peel back the
blinders on class, however, thereby exposing the underbelly
of our dominant economic ideology.
The collapsing market involved the failure and near
failure (the failure avoided only by a government rescue
plan) of the largest insurance company in the world, a host
of the largest investment banks (Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch) and a host of failing banks that had invested,
through the use of debt (borrowing the money to invest), in
stock tied to the falling housing market (bursting housing
bubble). It rocked the global financial market. In doing so it
revealed a number of important class-related factors.
First, it revealed the existence a class of people who
work in and control huge institutions and who treat
themselves very, very well through bonuses and executive
pay. Second, this class of people in the past have and
continue to treat themselves well, regardless of whether the
institutions they run are successful or not, and regardless of
whether the collapse of these institutions might hurt the
rest of us. Third, while we are told this class is
indispensable to us, this class is dependent on the hard-
earned savings of regular people and small businesses in
addition to the capital of other big companies and wealthy
people. Fourth, this class likely had access, through
"lobbyists," among others like Vice President Cheney, 63 to
the mechanisms of state power to further orchestrate their
work and well being. The government's attempt to privatize
Social Security, which would have provided this economically
63. Here Cheney's connections with Halliburton and Blackwater come to
mind, as do President Bush's connection with oil.
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powerful class of financiers access to play with the pension
funds of all in the country, seem to support the latter two
points.64 And finally, neither the market nor this group of
people seemed to have exhibited much of that famed
"rationality" that society hears so much about, at least
with regard to investing through debt in these housing
related securities.
Despite the extremely high visibility of this class
during the collapse of the financial sector, an event that
occurred within the last two months of the 2008 presidential
election, the discussion of the economy and "class" during
the presidential election, reflects the ways in which class is
masked, the way in which structured inequality between
the rich and poor is ignored, and the way in which the
status of the middle class is the norm and is reinforced.
Both the election and the market rescue provide evidence by
way of omission, for the way resources for the poor were
overlooked while the privilege and power of the affluent was
largely minimized but nevertheless secured.
Both Obama and McCain's campaign revolved around
changing the way Washington works, particularly the way
"lobbyists" behave. While the revolving door of lobbyists
between industry and government is itself an issue, this
issue masks potentially antagonistic class relations. That is,
it masks the fact that lobbyists are simply the errand boys
and girls of the economically powerful who control big
business in the country, it masks their power to influence
and control the rules which govern their operations, and it
masks any relations between the way they live and are
protected and the rest of American society.
Further, the campaigns reinforced the idea that the
middle class is the norm in the U.S. Both campaigns, but
particularly Obama's campaign, primarily talked about the
middle class and proposed the ever handy "tax cuts" for
them. The working class made a minor appearance in the
last days of the campaign, primarily through "Joe the
64. The government rescue package (put forth with the overwhelming
support of Democrats) with its minimum control over executive pay seemed to
be further evidence of this class' influence. See sources supra note 11.
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Plumber" and Obama's vice presidential candidate, Joe
Biden, from "working class Scranton." But even these in
some ways got dressed-up as the middle class because "Joe
the Plumber" liked the idea of buying a business and Biden,
well, was the vice presidential candidate for the Democrats.
The economically powerful, though highly visible because of
the financial market collapse, too only made a minor
appearance, primarily through Obama's policy regarding
taxes and the rich, "those making over $250,000 a year, and
they made a stealth appearance through McCain's policy
that no one should pay additional taxes. He sought to
protect the pocketbooks of all Americans, even those most
privileged by the organization of American society.
The poor or the conditions and relations that keep
them poor, save their own irresponsible behavior, rarely
even surfaced during the campaign and were largely
ignored. This was presumably because the normative
middle class was under siege and those things that might
help the middle class might also help the poor. However, it
is not clear whether tax cuts would help the poor, as many
of them do not now pay taxes. Nevertheless, the society
having long decided, particularly through welfare reform,
that the poor do not need "special preferences," seemed
poised through the election of one or another of McCain or
Obama to forward this policy and ideology of class blindness
while the bailout secured the interests, power, and well-
being of the wealthy.
With some of these and other understandings in
mind, the ClassCrit participants began their consideration
of employing a class analysis in their study of law and
economic inequality.
II. FRAMING A CRITIcAL CLASS ANALYSIS: THE ORGANIZERS'
ORIGINAL PROPOSITIONS AND THE WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS
The workshop participants struggled with the
organizers' proposal to engage a class analysis in their
examination of law and economic inequality. In doing so,
the groups both contested but nevertheless began to frame
the contours of a ClassCrit analysis of law and economic
inequality. The crucial insight was that this was to be a
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critical analysis. This section highlights some this work and
these discussions.
A. Examining Law and Economics Theory and Class
The initial intuitions of the group were that a more
grounded understanding of class relations would aid in
exposing the existence and the nature of economic power to
which a number of analyses seemed blind. Martha
McCluskey, one of the two principal organizers, in her
ongoing development of a critique of Law and Economics,
had argued that the development of law and economics had
not arisen simply out of intellectual interests. Rather, it had
come about, in part, because those who were likely to
benefit from its many findings that economic inequality was
"necessary, inevitable, and good," invested in its
development.65 Her analysis seemed to suggest that the
investors were pursuing their class interests. She made this
argument more explicit in the essay in this collection
discussing the Supreme Court's decision in the State Farm
case. 66 She argues here that State Farm itself, its practices,
and its claim about the unfairness of punitive damages for
multi-state abuses, 67 represented the organization of elite
interests and power in extracting profits out of economically
vulnerable people. The Court's decision, she suggests, not
only rendered the corporate claim valid but "equate[d] the
protection of these upper class interests with ideas of
"fundamental fairness, essential to neutral legal process."68
65. Martha T. McCluskey, The Substantive Politics of Formal Corporate
Power, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1453 (2006). See also Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking
with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right's Rise, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1191,
1212-28 (2007).
66. Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due
Process in State Farm, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1037 (2008).
67. State Farm Mut. Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003). State Farm challenged the imposition of punitive damages awarded to
insurance policy holders for State Farm's systematic violations of their
contractual rights. The Supreme Court overturned the award, limiting it. See
generally McCluskey, supra note 66.
68. See McCluskey, supra note 66, at 1037.
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These essays provide a number of provocative
thoughts. First they suggest that the economic inequality
that potentially results from these events is not just a
naturally occurring phenomenon, but instead, is the product
of human agency and groups of people organizing to protect
their economic power and interest. Second, these interests
are potentially class interests, elite class interests. Third,
these interests are not simply protected through winning
certain economic contests-offering the best price for a
product or improved quality-but are also fought and won
through contests over ideas about what works or what is
right in the cultural realm. Fourth, law is implicated and
employed in these struggles both in mediating the contests
and in ideologically legitimating one side or another while
potentially structuring and shaping the nature of both the
contestants (here law is essential in creating and
legitimating the corporate form known as State Farm) and
the contest itself. These insights seem to cut against
discussing simply the different income levels of individuals
and groups in social or economic life or simply discussing
the formal assertions of equality or equal opportunity in law
and economic life. Instead they seem to call for discussions
about the unequal distribution of wealth and power; they
seem to call for foregrounding and making visible issues
of class.
In general, McCluskey argues that Law and
Economics is a "theory aimed at making economic inequality
seem legitimate, inevitable and even beautiful, smart and
just."69 She analyzes how concepts like "efficiency" and
"economic growth" mask conflicting class interests and
problematic ideology, turning problematic policy choices
into neutral and inevitable forces of "nature."7 While
69. McCluskey Thought Piece, supra note 20. Specifically McCluskey
argues that this theory justifies and whitewashes economic inequality and
subordination and it does so by employing what she called a master narrative.
This narrative juxtaposed "economics" or "efficiency" (meant to mean a growing
economic pie) or some other economic concept against some policy meant to
bring about equality, justice, or fairness. The narrative then delivered a three-
part message meant to diminish and discredit efforts geared toward bringing




McCluskey admits that the benefit of Law and Economics is
that it asks for every move, how much will it cost and who
pays; it often leaves out who benefits, who loses, who
decides, and how.71 A class analysis often emerges from
these analyses.
B. Critical Race Theory and Class
While McCluskey's work emerges from an engagement
with Law and Economics, my work, representing the other
principal organizer, grows out of my engagement with
critical race theory (CRT),72 and my concern about the
underdevelopment of its analysis of the role of class. Critical
race theory has always argued that the "class system in the
U.S. mutually constructs race, gender and other forms of
oppression."73 But critical race theorists (race crits) have
failed to develop a systematic analysis of the ways in which
this happens. In fact, although CRT recognizes that the
system of racial formation is a pillar of American society
that has both material and cultural bases, much of the
scholarship seems to focus on the cultural aspects of this
phenomenon--on "texts, narrative, ideas and meanings,"
which convey ideas that certain groups are unworthy-
rather than the material aspects of racial subordination.
Richard Delgado, drawing on much of Derrick Bell's work,
chastises that "while text, attitude, and intention may play
important roles in our system of racial hierarchy, material
factors such as profits and the labor market are even more
decisive in determining who falls where in that system.
74
71. Id.
72. Mutua, supra note 14, at 379.
73. Id.
74. Delgado, supra note 25, at 123 (reviewing DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL
AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH (2002)). Delgado discusses
many of Bell's earlier works in this piece, including DERRICK BELL, RACE,
RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAw (4th ed. 2000) and Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24
CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992).
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Specifically I suggested that the addition of critical
class analyses would aid in further understanding racial
structure and might aid in promoting racial justice. That is,
I suggested that the racialized economic production and
allocation of material resources accumulated over the last
several hundred years was "unlikely [to] be eliminated
without addressing the structural and economic foundations
of class. Thus, an understanding of the operation of class
was necessary. At the same time, it was not clear that the
economic harms of lower class suffering would be eliminated
without addressing both the material and psychological
seductions embodied and structured by race; structures in
which the poorest of the poor of whites, in part, endure their
impoverishment as long as they are "not black," or, for that
matter, "not in China."75
From this perspective, I am also inclined to ask why
societies are producing Viagra and not malaria pills. Who
decides? Who benefits? What is lost? Or, why 40,000
children starve each day if the global society can produce
enough food to feed all the people in the world-what is
wrong with our production and distribution system? And
finally, why in both of these scenarios are people of color
and women likely the first and the worst harmed? While the
simple answer to some of these questions was simply that
one is more profitable than another, a critical class analysis
seemed poised to more thoroughly explore these issues.
Questioning the outcomes of the rescue debacle of
Hurricane Katrina brought some of these ideas to the fore.
It also raised a second potential need and justification for
pursuing a class analysis. Race questions in popular culture
are increasingly reduced to questions of who did what
I have also suggested that a critical class analysis might have something
important to say about the modern social economic processes which over the last
several years have shaped segmented joblessness and stagnating wages for the
overwhelming majority of the population, which has occurred in the face of
increasing productivity, a growing economy, staggering profits, and
incomprehensible executive pay as mediated by the corporation and justified by
an array of people institutionally and otherwise placed. Mutua, supra note 14,
at 389.
75. Mutua, supra note 14, at 389.
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where-a question about an individual's racist intent; as
opposed to an analysis of the structured, material, and
economic conditions of race and class. I posited four
questions based on the media's framing of the issues
surrounding Hurricane Katrina.
First: Whether the governments' slow, seemingly
disinterested response and inadequate rescue of the mostly
African American people stranded in the flooded city of New
Orleans was a result of racism. I noted that this was a
typical race consciousness question.
A second question was: Why so many black people
stayed behind or found themselves stranded or left behind
in New Orleans during the Hurricane. I posited that they
did not stay behind because they were black but rather
because they were poor. This, it seemed to me, was the class
question.
The third question asked: Why the majority of the
poor people [left behind] in New Orleans appeared to be
overwhelmingly black when they constituted only a little
over a third of the metropolitan area's 1.3 million people,
and when most others got out of New Orleans before the
storm. This question seemed to implicate the intersection
and interaction of both class and race as they developed
over time in New Orleans.
And finally the fourth question contemplated: Why
the policy that promoted simply the evacuation of the city
seemed blind to the realities of poverty in New Orleans.
Here it seemed the answer was that a norm of adequate
wealth, of middle class status, in part, drove this reality. A
class analysis, complete with an understanding of the ways
in which it operated, appeared important to society
generally, and particularly important to understanding
racial formation and the structuring of race.
C. The Labor Law Perspective
Several of the workshop participants had come to the
question of class from their expertise in labor law.
Consideration of class has been much less visible within law
than it has in some other disciplines such as sociology and
history, and, to the extent that class analyses may be
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visible, it is often cabined in the area of labor law. 76 But the
study of labor law itself has been struggling to maintain
visibility and influence, as union participation has
declined. 77 Both developments likely contribute to the
blindness to class that seems prevalent.
These scholars were in a unique position to inform our
discussions because labor law has historically addressed the
ways in which unequal economic power manifests in laws
that constrain the power and benefits of workers and the
ways in which people's control over, or lack of access, to
economic resources positioned them vis-A-vis others and the
state. Further, these particular scholars also brought a
variety of theories and understandings about class and how
it works. They urged us not only to center class in our
analysis of the impact of law on economic inequality but
they joined a chorus of others in advocating that our
understanding of class be grounded in a relational
understanding of class.
D. Confronting Notions of Equality
Not all of the participants agreed to a specific class focus
in the group's analysis. For instance, Martha Fineman,
entering the discussion from a feminist perspective,
advocated for the group to ground its investigation of
economic inequality in the development of a substantive
understanding of equality. 78 Formal equality, as all too often
practiced and advocated in law, tends to treat all people the
same regardless of the context and conditions that make
them different in the first place. Formal equality is an
improvement over a time when law failed to recognize the
basic humanity of all people, instead distinguishing them
for the purposes of elevating and providing access to
76. I thank Martha McCluskey for this insight.
77. Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race,
Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 845 (2003).
78. Fineman, supra note 20. Her position was in some ways pragmatic in
that equality is universal and individualistic and in this way mirrors American
law's protection of individual groups. But equality, she also argued, did not




resources for the individuals of some groups, and
disadvantaging and limiting access to resources for other
groups-men distinguished from and over women, white
people distinguished from and over black people. The
current tendency, however, is to ignore the ways these
historically created inequalities remain and are recreated
today through a variety of social structures, systems, and
ideologies.
Instead, Fineman advocated for a substantive concept of
equality that would encompass a range of factors along with
economics. She urged a concept that would seek to spread
the benefits and burdens of society including its economic
benefits more broadly and more equally; one that would
take into account the social and material contexts as well as
the social conditions and choices that made people unequal
in the first place; and one that would recognize that the
problem was not simply discrimination, for which the same
treatment might be the solution, but rather was the
unequal production and allocation of resources and status.
In short she sought a substantive concept of equality that
would recognize, account for, and address the relative
differences in privilege and power of individuals and groups
and the way they are socially structured and organized.
Fineman also argued for a rejection of understanding
equality through a narrow concept of autonomy. She urged
the group, rather than viewing equality through the lens of
autonomy-as individual independence and self-sufficiency-
to develop a substantive view and commitments to equality
as inclusive, through which to ensure that people have what
they need to be autonomous.7 9 That is, she urged a view
that would view autonomy through equality.8 0
79. Id. Fineman notes:
In . . . exploring equality in the context of balancing against other
values, I think we must begin the hard work of constructing in and for
the American context a viable and credible alternative concept of
equality, moving beyond a formal to a more substantive fore. The
project here is to shift the frame from autonomy back onto a focus on
equality. This framing process is not only descriptive, it is normative; a
way to give a different meaning to a series of issues and help redefine
them in a more progressive manner. If the frame were equality rather
than autonomy, then perhaps our first question would not be how we
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E. What about Liberty?: Aren't We All Just Liberals?
The workshop discussions also identified a number of
additional issues in trying to further define the project. The
group identified current understandings of liberty and
autonomy, as well as a more general commitment to
liberalism, as obstacles to addressing the challenges that
class may pose. In doing so, the group was urged to re-
define "liberty," and to wrestle with the nature of the project
in terms of whether it sought a "classless society," an end to
all inequality, or whether it was largely reformist,
committed to some level of inequality among individuals, if
not also groups. Further, the group explored the question of
Marxism, and what role it might play in their analyses
more generally. The group, however, did decide that their
approach to a class analysis of law and inequality would be
a critical interdisciplinary approach and one committed to
praxis.
Angela Harris asked that we consider redefining the
concept of "liberty," echoing Martha Fineman's comments
about autonomy. Liberty is currently understood as the
right to be left alone, to be separate, to be autonomous and
self-sufficient. This understanding seemed blind to the fact
can define equality in terms that are consistent with the dictates of
autonomy (the individual perspective). Instead, we might pursue how
society must ensure autonomy as a basic guarantee, a foundation
necessary for and consistent with our primary commitment to equality
(an inclusive perspective).
Id.
80. Id. Fineman's thoughts in many ways make clearer the areas on
which all the participants appeared to agree. First, Fineman's use of the terms
"equality," "discrimination," even "autonomy," targeted a group of lawyers
whose central strength was likely to be in exposing the way in which law
shapes, structures, and legitimizes, in economic terms, the current or
alternative patterns of production and allocation of resources. Second, given
that economic inequality is brought about through the way in which society
organizes the production and allocation of material resources, the group was
interested in both context and choice. That is, the participants were interested
in a substantive structural view of economics and economic inequality that
would expose collective structures, coercion, and interests, in addition to
intention and choice. Third, they were interested in the role economic privilege
and power plays in economic inequality both in determining certain patterns (of
production and allocation) and in blocking alternatives.
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that economic deprivation is coercive and that it is difficult
to be self-sufficient and to implement individual choice
when one does not have the resources to do so. In other
words, a person who has nothing can be made to do
anything. She suggested the group work on redefining
liberty to include having the necessary resources-food,
health care, the freedom from the coercion of want-that
provide individuals the basis to be relatively autonomous, to
exercise their choices. Such a view also would take into
account that the things that people have and receive are
socially produced and allocated and thus can be produced
and allocated differently than they now are.
Related to this idea, Harris challenged the vision of
the project more generally. She asked whether, despite the
decision to focus on class, weren't we all simply "liberals"
and whether we were okay with that. Her question seemed
to reference liberalism not as commitment to political
democracy, or to the protection to individual liberty as the
basis of the both society and law, but rather liberalism as a
commitment to a capitalist or market economy centered around
the protection of private property. Under this commitment to
a market economy one could be "conservative-stressing
negative rights for protecting individual liberty, free
markets, and rejection of government intervention in the
economy; progressive-stressing positive rights, and
government intervention in the economy for the provision of
individuals' well being," or anything in between.
8'
In other words, Harris challenged the group to cede
the point that this was basically a reformist project.
Although not all the participants would agree, most of the
participants were likely to admit that they were committed
to transforming through reform the market exchange
economy rather than seeking to eliminate or overthrow it.
This position, however, cedes to some level of economic
inequality, even if one thinks that "human flourishing
81. Athena D. Mutua, Restoring Justice to Civil Rights Movement
Activists?: New Historiography and the "Long Civil Rights Era" (2008), available
at http://works.bepress.com/AthenaMutua/1 (suggesting that liberalism
encompasses these three ideas: political democracy, individualism, and a
commitment to a market economy).
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would be broadly enhanced by . . . [an] egalitarian
distribution of the material conditions of life." 2 That is, at
least at the individual level, if two people start off in exactly
the same position but one works harder, then the person
who has worked harder is viewed as "justly" better
rewarded, even as such rewards lead to inequality between
the individuals.8 3
From this discussion it appeared that the group's
concern with inequality was that it represented a real
amassing and monopolization of the world's material
resources by the few, depriving most people of any resources
at all; and thereby cementing and widening historical
patterns of exploitation, subordination, and marginalization
for large groups of people. For many, there seemed a
concern that these increasing levels of inequality have been
built on and have created an economy in the U.S. and the
world that is fundamentally unfair.
82. Wright, supra note 55, at 6.
83. Erik Olin Wright, in providing a stripped down overview of Marxist
normative commitments, explains three theses. These are in unqualified form:
1) Radical Egalitarian thesis: Human flourishing would be broadly
enhanced by a radically egalitarian distribution of the material
conditions of life ....
2) Historical possibility thesis: Under conditions of a highly productive
economy, it becomes materially possible to organize society in such a
way that there is a sustainable radically egalitarian distribution of the
material conditions of life ....
3) Anti-capitalism thesis: Capitalism blocks the possibility of achieving
a radically egalitarian distribution of the material conditions of life.
Wright, supra note 55, at 6-7. He then notes the standard response to these
theses; He says:
Against the radical Egalitarianism thesis two sorts of arguments are
frequently raised; First, even if it is true that equality promotes human
flourishing, the redistribution of resources needed for material equality
is unjust since it deprives some people of material advantages which
they have rightfully acquired; and second, far from creating conditions
for a flourishing of human potential, radical material equality would
generate passivity, laziness, and uniformity.
Id. at 8 n.6.
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Further, the project seemed poised to explore the way in
which economic power controls people and the market, and
distorts the market and the state. This notion included
exploring and exposing the ways in which class structures
are obscured in part through the denial that they even exist.
It included exploring the claims that the market is
naturally occurring, that it is fair, that it can solve all
problems, that all people have equal access to it, and that
the market is a fair judge of merit as opposed to biased
toward those with money, wealth, and power. In addition,
the project seemed poised to question whether such power
may block the state from fulfilling its role of regulating and
organizing the society on behalf of all while ignoring that
the state, whether it chooses to regulate the market or not,
is nonetheless a huge market actor. And it would focus in
part on the ways in which these concerns were shaped and
structured by law.
Finally, the project seemed open to the suggestion that
the economically powerful need not be seen to operate in
one particular way. Rather, there seemed room to
understand the organization and interests of classes,
including elite classes, as variable, even if they are
understood as inclined toward accumulating and hoarding
resources, understood as being in tension with laboring
classes, and inclined toward pursuing primarily only those
avenues viewed as profitable.84 These ideas seemed to
provide a way forward for challenging, halting and
transforming the patterns of increasing inequality.
F. Specters of Marxism
Harris' question helped raise another issue. To what
extent was the group prepared to employ Marxist analysis
per se? Much of the second workshop was spent on this and
related questions, as well as reviewing a number of Marx-
influenced works. Some in the group argued that the project
should be post-Marxist, in part already an inclination, given
84. I thank Makau Mutua for this insight. Said differently, this
sentiment rejects the idea that actions of the economically powerful are pre-
determined even if they are pre-disposed to act in certain ways.
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the group's orientation toward the role of culture and
ideology in economic relations. However, others, for
instance, Anthony Farley, commented, to roars of laughter,
that most of us could not be post-Marxist because we were
never Marxists in the first place. He urged at least some
real engagement with Marxist text and ideas.
Yet, what became obvious in the discussion was that
the fear of engaging Marxist analysis frontally and publicly
was only outstripped by the lack of detailed knowledge
surrounding it by a notable size of the group. Though a
number of people had studied Marx and other class
theorists quite broadly, it was clear that a not insignificant
part of the group, a group that represented some of the most
well-educated and privileged members of the American
society as part of the intellectual elite, had never been
exposed to any significant study of Marxist themes.
This discussion further revealed that though
engagement with Marx has been historically and
systematically discouraged politically in the U.S., with few
courses across the nation that even teach it, the fear
surrounding it, as evidenced by the conference discussion,
keeps that exclusion in place. This likely contributes to the
overall picture of class blindness that emerges in the U.S.85
Further, in many ways this lack of knowledge made an
assessment of Marxist application to the project
challenging. Yet, because there is over a hundred years of
scholarship around class and political economy analyzing
Marxist, Weberian, and other insights, and this scholarship
has continued to build in almost every part of the world
including the U.S., though widely discouraged, the group
ventured forward.
G. Scope and Application
As another important part of the discussion that
framed a critical perspective, the group agreed that it was
important to bring an interdisciplinary analysis to the
85. See generally Mutua, supra note 14.
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question of law and inequality.86 Critical analysis of law
recognizes that law is not autonomous but must be related
to history, politics, culture, language, narrative, and other
fields of study. Although the prominent "Law and
Economics" approach is interdisciplinary, this dominant
approach takes a narrow orthodox approach to economics.
ClassCrits would seek to bring in the work of progressive
economists left out of that orthodox economics.
And finally, the group agreed that a critical analysis
of law and economic inequality should be informed by the
actual practice and social justice efforts occurring
throughout the country, and that the group would make its
work accessible to such groups. In other words, the group
was committed to praxis and to actively doing something
about inequality. Praxis in this sense meant a commitment
to working with people who might "benefit in a reasonably
immediate and material way from a change in existing
economic inequality.87 As a practical matter, the group
talked about ensuring the participation of community
activists who worked on these and related issues to the
group's conferences. The group also committed to ensuring
that some portion of their written work was accessible to
the general public.
III. EMBRACING A RELATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF CLASS
Two points emerged from our discussions of what it
would mean to explore economic inequality through the lens
of class. First, the analysis must go beyond poverty. Second,
an analysis of economic class or inequality must be
relational rather than status-based.
86. It was eventually decided that the very next gathering would be a
conference that took an interdisciplinary approach and which would invite
scholars across a range of fields to participate. Some folks were particularly
interested in involving progressive economists. And the group committed to
drawing on the wealth of material out there on class.
87. Frances Ansley, Thought Piece (undated) (unpublished manuscript




First the group agreed that the study of law and
economic inequality was not simply about the study of law
and poverty or the poor. Though the group expressed a
concern for those who are economically disadvantaged, and
a commitment to study the nature and structure of that
disadvantage, the group decided that exploration of
economic inequality involved exploring the way law
contributed to or abated economic inequality experienced by
both those who were privileged by that inequality as well as
those who were disadvantaged by it. The study of poverty,
some suggested, was often the study of status, not class.
That is, poverty was often viewed as a status that deviates
from middle class norms, and the middle class itself as a
status, rather than a class. In other words, the study was
pursued as if the status of poverty or the status of the poor
was unrelated to the status of the privileged, as opposed to
related to it, and thus for a variety of reasons blinded the
society to the nature and exercise of power which was
implicated in the existence of poverty.
The second insight, building on the first, was that the
study of class implicated the relational nature of inequality;
that the power of some to decide what, when, and how
economic resources will be produced, distributed, and used,
and to reap the benefits from that organization and those
decisions, is related to and dependent on the exclusion of
and possibly the control over unequal others.88 The notion
that economic inequality, and thus class, is relational arose
from multiple perspectives at the workshops.8 9 However,
88. Frank Munger, Thought Piece (undated) (unpublished manuscript
submitted to ClassCrits Workshop, Baldy Center for Law & Social Policy) (on
file with author).
89. For instance, although labor law can be, and often is, discussed in
terms of employer/employee relations without any significant reference to or
theories about class relations, the labor law scholar's present emphasized
relational class arguments that in part structure labor relations. See Kenneth
Casebeer, Of Service Workers, Contracting Out, Joint Employment, Legal
Consciousness, and the University of Miami, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1061 (2008);
James Pope, Class Conflicts of Law I: Unilateral Worker Lawmaking versus
Unilateral Employer Lawmaking in the U.S. Workplace, 56 BuFF. L. REV. 1097
(2008). Others engaged Marxian/Weberian relational understanding of class
analysis more directly; see, e.g., Anthony Farley, The Colorline as Capitalist
Accumulation, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 955 (2008); while others drew from a variety of
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particular reference was made to Martha Mahoney's article
analyzing what she called the anti-transformation (race)
cases.9 ° In the article Mahoney notes that popular notions of
class in America understand class as status-based,
reflecting in cake-like fashion various stratified income
levels and lifestyles that have little to do with one another.
She urged that legal theoreticians reject these "vulgar
status" conceptions of class, which divorce the socio-
economic status of individuals from group relations of
capital, production, and power, as readily as they reject
"vulgar Marxism," which refers to "a crude economic
determinism."91 Instead, she had advocated for a relational
understanding of class, arguing that status-based notions of
class reinforced assumptions, and made inevitable and
natural, understandings that the white working class is and
should be attached to whiteness and the unearned privilege
it provides; a point I will return to later.
Frank Munger, a workshop participant, explains that
a class perspective emphasizes the relational nature of
inequality under capitalism, in which the wealth and power
of some depends on the subordination and poverty of
others.92 This idea is in direct opposition to a neoclassical
approach, which asserts that, as Munger notes:
My power or wealth has nothing to do with your poverty.
Differences are natural-something we bring to the market that
cannot be blamed on the system itself. The system will do the best
job of redistributing control of resources, given the differences
among individuals' needs, interests and wealth. The system has
no way of taking accounting of human rights-the rights essential
other class theorists such as Bourdieu; see, e.g., Lucille Jewel, Bourdieu and
American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification
and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1157 (2008); Martha Mahoney, supra
note 75.
90. See Mahoney, supra note 75, at 799.
91. Id.
92. Munger, supra note 88. This is so even though it is readily believed
that the economy, and particularly the global economy, implicates the
interconnectedness, relatedness and dependence of one country to another,
demand for oil in China relates to and impacts the supply, demand, and price of
oil in the United States-or the wealth of one is related to and dependent on the
poverty of others, albeit in a complex and shifting sort of way. Id.
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to individuals as human being. The analysis overlooks the
distribution of wealth and power that gives meaning and form to
the market.
93
In other words, whether under a Marxian or Weberian
influenced understanding, a relational understanding of
class and economic inequality recognizes that the ownership
and control over material resources by some individuals and
groups is related to the exclusion of control over those same
material resources for others. 94 For instance, the ownership
of land by some people excludes others from controlling and
possibly using that same land for their sustenance.
Sociologist Erik Wright clarifies that a relational
understanding of class contemplates social relations that
determine, over time, the patterns of rights and powers of
individuals and groups to and over the material resources
used in the production of goods and services for the
sustenance of and consumption by (primarily) humans. 95
Concerned with the material stuff, these social relations are
economic relations of power. Four ideas are important
here. 96 They are:
1) that productive resources are material resources such
as oil, trees, water, land, equipment, etc., which are put to
productive use;
2) that the rights and powers 97-ownership or relative
control-over those material resources are determined,
structured and patterned over time through human activity
and social interaction, whether out of the barrel of a gun,
the constrained consent of the population, or otherwise;
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Wright, Foundations of a Neo-Marxist Class Analysis, supra note 55,
at 23-28 (discussing the similarities and differences between Marxist and
Weberian class analyses).
95. Id.
96. This is my interpretation of Wright.
97. Rights and powers over material resources relate to the relative




3) that the social relations which determine ownership
and control over productive resources provide economic and
political power for some at the exclusion of others-control
of land for some is related to the exclusion of that same land
for others as well as possibly the exploitation,
marginalization and subordination of those excluded from
significant control over those productive resources;
4) That control and ownership or the exclusion from
control over material resources determine where one is
located within the market of exchange and/or within the
productive process, 98 such that at the micro-level "what you
have determines what you get . . . [and] what you have
determines what you have to do to get what you get"--the
work you have to do to keep from starving and to live. That
is, that one's standing or location in the class structure
determines your life chances, and in part, what kind of
action in concert with others you might take ... what power
you have. 00
Here, according to Marx, exists another level of
relational structures, structures of exploitation. Specifically
the idea is that capitalist profits are not only related to, but
dependent upon, the labor of the workers. In other words,
the capitalists and workers are structurally related whereby
the capitalist's wealth and power are dependent on the
control and products of the labor of unequal others, the
worker's labor. The more the capitalist can exploit the
worker, the higher he likely profits. In this sense, capitalists
98. See id.
99. Id. at 22.
100. Id. at 26-30. At the same time those with the rights and powers to
control material resources and to yield such resources productive or profitable-
the owners of capital-have an objective interest in ensuring that some portion
of the population remains vulnerable to some level of material deprivation in
order to ensure those so vulnerable will provide the labor they need to render
the resources they control productive. In other words, they hope to ensure that
there are people available to work. In addition, they have an interest in
accumulating as much of the material resources as possible-the more they
have, the more they can put to productive use for profit. At the same time, the
more they accumulate the more they may be able to further deprive additional
others of those same resources. In doing, so they make larger pools of people
vulnerable and in need of work. These are elite class interests.
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need workers. And because capitalists need workers, the
workers themselves have some form of potential power in
class terms. They may have other kinds of power as well,
such as rule-making power in a democratic society,
assuming the concentration of economic power has not
bought and sold political actors and thus overwhelmed the
democratic process. 101 But here workers have class power to
the extent that they can organize around work. 102
The rights and powers of individuals and groups over
the material resources needed to sustain human life as they
develop over time implicates not only the relations between
individuals and groups but also the social practices,
contests, and rules, both formal and informal, that help to
structure and cement those relations. In other words, it
implicates law. As legal academics, the group was
particularly interested in this understanding of class
because it aided in foregrounding what Litowitz called the
background rules, the hegemonic economic code of law in
the U.S. under capitalism. This code of background rules
consist of rules that privilege "private ownership of
property, employment at will, inheritance, freedom of
101. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, RICHARD S.
CARNELL, BANKING LAw AND REGULATION (2001) (providing a historical overview
of banking law and discussing the debate between Alexander Hamilton and
Thomas Jefferson over the establishment of a national bank and noting that
Jefferson feared the concentration of economic power and viewed all
corporations as problematic). See also NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, THOMAS
JEFFERSON VERSUS ALEXANDER HAMILTON: CONFRONTATIONS THAT SHAPED A
NATION (2000).
102. These are not the only class relations that exist in a society like the
United States. For example, there exist huge pools of vulnerable people who do
not have work. While their relations with other classes are structured around
their exclusion from controlling material resources, they have little power to
bargain over work, although they can disrupt work and the society as a whole
through, for instance, riots. At the same time, the production of goods and
services is not the only way to make a profit; one can be a lender of money, a
lender of resources, which will allow for profit making. Financiers, a part of the
capitalist class, are particularly important in modern society. And then, there
are still others, workers with specialized skills and managers and consumption
patterns around education, for instance, that yield these positions. These are all
part of the complex class structures, among others, that currently exist and
around which sets of complex rules and laws have emerged both producing and
structuring these relations. Wright, supra note 55, at 26-30.
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contract, limited liability for business organizations,
patriarchy, and a regime of negative rights that ensures
that individuals must secure their own health care, day
care, and other benefits." These background rules constitute
the legal framework that helps to organize the rights,
powers and exclusion of individuals and groups over the
material resources needed to sustain human life.
Ultimately, a relational understanding of class and
economic inequality thus also centers relations of power,
bringing this power to the fore when other analyses are
blind to it. Such an understanding of class primarily focuses
on those groups with access and control over material
resources, particularly productive resources, and those
without; and the ways in which those with control have
power to influence the production, distribution and
consumption of those resources, as well as to influence the
rules that help to structure that production, distribution,
and consumption.
Mahoney makes two other points that are relevant to
this discussion. The first is that even though a relational
understanding of class is structural, the way in which
groups of people understand this structure, discuss it, and
are informed by it, is a cultural phenomenon. For an
analogy, the way in which the different sexes are embodied
is structural, biological, but what we make of those
differences is cultural. Where the analogy fails is that class
structures, the system of class relations, are not biological
or natural, but the product of past human action. Further,
to the extent that what we make of the relations of class is
cultural, it is contestable. That is, the interest can be
defined, seen, and experienced a vast number of ways and
we often struggle over it. Further, the rules of law as a
distinct discourse and a way of organizing groups and
contest is one way of both culturally and structurally
shaping the way in which we define our interests as classes
and groups. 1
0 3
103. Mahoney, supra note 75, at 829. Here Mahoney argues that law
dresses many of the class cases up as race cases. On agency she notes: 'The lack
of a language of class, the status/stratification concept of inequality, and the
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The second point Mahoney makes is that for class to
form culturally, there must be concerted action by groups of
individuals. They must organize around class or their
different economic interests. And, whether groups of people
so organize or not, is contingent. That is, they may organize
around class, or they may organize around other factors
that seem more relevant or salient to their lives, such as
race, gender, or sexuality.
Both points lead Mahoney to the central idea,
drawing on E.P Thompson, that class is not a thing but
rather a happening, something that must be done. 0 4 This
seems particularly true for working class groups whose
subordination seems to emanate from a variety of different
sources, unlike that section of the elite whose economic
interests are directly tied to the control over subordinate
groups and workers and thus who see their own immediate
interests quite clearly.
dynamics of racial privilege and subordination are all important to the ways
Americans understand themselves and each other." Id at 829.
"Class" is generally invisible in American legal discourse. The term is
used constantly ("class action," "classification") in reference to issues
other than social and economic inequality and power. When used in law
with regard to economic inequality, the term usually refers to
gradational rather than relational concepts. Legal discussions of
structural inequality seldom use the term "class," instead discussing
"race," "poverty," "employee," or 'labor," none of which adequately
replaces the concept of class. In different ways, each of these terms
addresses some questions of power, but none directly addresses the
relationships of power between social groups. Since law more easily
recognizes race and gender rather than class issues, the need to shape
legally cognizable claims has also tended to diminish consciousness of
and arguments about class. Recent proposals to use "class" instead of
race as the basis for affirmative action have not explored the meaning
of class in any relational sense and in reality concern more or less
elaborated status-based criteria.
Id. at 842-43.
104. Id. (citing E.P. THOMPSON, MAKING HISTORY: WRITINGS ON HISTORY
AND CULTURE 222 (1994). Kenneth Casebeer agrees, in part, noting that because
in part "of the need to legitimate particular social relations, from fashions to
family life, many cultural assumptions and instrumental social actions
contribute to class distinctions." Kenneth Casebeer, Thought Piece (undated)
(unpublished manuscript submitted to ClassCrits Workshop, Baldy Center for
Law & Social Policy) (on file with author).
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IV. INTERSECTIONALITY OF CLASS, RACE, AND
GENDER AND THE BLINDING CONFLATION OF
RACE AND CLASS STATUS
The other major tenet that the workshop agreed upon
was that the intersection of race and gender (including
sexuality)105 was central to discussions and practices of
class. For many of us, this point was obvious. For instance,
although both slavery and Jim Crow, as well as today's
oppressive racial spatial isolation, were racial systems that
oppressed and offended human dignity, they also were
economic systems meant to facilitate the exploitation of
black labor, to deny black material well-being, and to assist
the few in hoarding the resources created by the many. This
racial system relationally also privileges whiteness both
materially and psychologically through the full range of
social systems and institutions including the economy,
political system, educational system, etc., setting up a
hierarchy of the "races" that renders black racial identity,
among others, a racial status within a caste-like system
where large numbers of blacks are part of the working poor
but in which almost all blacks, even those of the black
middle class, are both materially and expressively
subordinate. 106
Further, we knew that gender relations support the
limitation of women's opportunities while privileging men.
And, they render invisible the production and reproduction
of labor in the domestic sphere done (and required) mostly
of women while simultaneously diminishing the value of the
105. Here I am positing that sexuality is more closely related to gender
than to racism or class oppression, drawing on Harry Brod & Michael Kaufman,
Introduction, in THEORIZING MASCULINITIES, supra note 36, at 5. See also Mutua,
supra note 29, at 12-16 (on the sex gender system and masculine socialization).
106. For instance, the black middle class (from an income status
perspective) is significantly less wealthy than not only the white middle class,
but generally have less wealth than the white working class. See, e.g., MELVIN
L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 8 (1995) (describing a difference in financial
assets of $25,794 when a black household has the same educational and
occupational attributes as the average white household); see generally DOUGLAS
S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
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labor such production requires. The gender system relationally
privileges males both materially and psychologically
through the full range of social systems and institutions
including economically, politically educationally, etc., setting
up a hierarchy of the genders that renders women, and the
feminine more generally, a gendered status within a
caste-like system where women are disproportionately
poor, potentially exploited but in any event, subordinate. 107
Moreover we knew that each individual and group
was not only raced and gendered but also classed. That is,
that race, gender, and class intersect. What became clear,
however, was that a relational understanding of class
provided many in the group with another tool of analysis, a
tool that we could use together with our understandings of
race, gender, and intersectionality, which would aid us in
unraveling a blinding conflation in the American setting, a
conflation of class with race. Exposing this conflation
potentially opens space for the possibility of solidarity.
Race and gender are typically understood as status-
based systems. That is, those disadvantaged by race or
gender are often seen as situated in a status hierarchy or
caste-like system where cultural ideas about their identities
mark them for various forms of subordination, super-
exploitation, and limited opportunities. In this sense, caste
is not class. Yet as Forbath notes, though class and status
hierarchies [castes] are analytically separable, they are not
distinct social phenomena. 108 In practice, in real life, "they
107. Again, much is written about the way in which law often operates in a
manner that supports patriarchy and diminishes the needs, bodies, lives, and
opportunities of women. However, not only are all men privileged by gender
relations, but elite men are vastly disproportionately privileged by this system.
This is so because they control productive material resources and can rely on
systems that undervalue women's labor in the workplace and therefore render
them a cheaper labor pool. Further, the mass reproduction of human capital and
labor on which elite organized production is dependant can be had without being
responsive to or in any significant way responsible for supporting that
reproduction and production. So while all men benefit, elite men (and sometimes
women) with access and power over productive resources benefit the most.
108. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 16 (1999).
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overlap and shape one another."109 Intersectional theory
aids in demonstrating this.
Intersectional theory, which developed in the context
of explicating black women's lives, begins to get at the idea
that multiple systems shape individuals and group's life
chances. Intersectional theory rejected a single axis
framework for analyzing black women's lives. It rejected the
idea that black women were oppressed by race OR sexism
but posited instead that black women's lives were oppressed
by both gender and racism, as well as by class. Each
organization of hierarchical power relations inherent to the
different systems of class, race, and sex shape and constrain
both black women's material and expressive conditions. And
they shape them in ways that are different from those of, for
example, black men or poor whites.
When a relational understanding of class is added to
these analyses, the conflation of class and race at the
intersection of class and race is exposed and solidarity at
least becomes more plausible. In this, Mahoney's article is
again instructive.
Mahoney explains that conversations about class in
the U.S. often are really conversations about an individual's
socio-economic status, perhaps related to consumption, but
unrelated to control over productive material resources. 110
This is class status as opposed to relational class. Status,
she explains, tends to be a zero-sum game; so that providing
increased status to one group automatically lowers the
status of another group. In addition there are often only two
statuses discussed in the U.S. These are the middle class
and the underclass status. But further, both of these
statuses are racialized, such that the middle class (really a
status) is white and the underclass is black (or of color).
Here lies the conflation of class as race at the intersection of
race and class. Under this understanding of class as status,
109. Id.
110. And even then there are only really two such statuses worth
discussing, the middle class (really status) and the underclass, both of which are
racialized; the middle class is white and the underclass is black or Latino. See
Mahoney, supra note 75, at 829.
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whether race prejudice is present or not, race privilege is
status enhancing and attachment to it seems natural.
In this context then, the white working class' "economic"
interests are primarily concerns about race status?111 So for
instance, as Martha Mahoney elaborates, calls to eliminate
raced based affirmative action programs in the workplace
and to replace them with class based considerations are not
concerns about working class issues which presumably
might benefit all workers, but rather are concerns about
protecting the status of the white working class. They are
calls to protect white (racial) privilege. These are demands
to protect the status quo of white privilege built on the
foundations of white supremacy in which neither poor
Chinese or working class Indians in the world, nor
underemployed African Americans or Latinos in the U.S.,
should live as well as whites. These calls suggest-
assuming, uncritically, limited resources-that only whites
should live well, including working class whites, or at least
that this segment of the working class, whites, should live
better than all others. Thus the calls and cases pit the white
111. Martha Mahoney notes:
The process of "making class" involves agency and cultural and
economic relationships. In "making class," therefore, white privilege is
crucially important. If class is "a happening," not "a thing," then the
very "happening" of class is shaped by both conscious and unconscious
white choices. Since whiteness is also an interaction between the
material world and our experience of it, class interest is one of the most
important ways in which shared identity can affect the experience of
self, identity, and interest for white working people. In other words,
strong working class identity can help whites be less defined by their
positioned perspective or by attachment to privilege.
Conversely, attachment to privilege diminishes solidaristic identification.
Both privilege and positioned perception shape "men's ideas and values
. . . actions, choices, and beliefs" by distributing benefits and by
justifying them. Whiteness can therefore facilitate the sense of "middle
class" status expressed by many American workers. Race is part of the
construction of class-as-status in America, and status-consciousness is
part of what defeats the development of solidaristic consciousness.
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working class against people of color, undermining any
solidarity that might arise or be cultivated to improve the
life chances of all working people. 112 This is so even though
the status quo apparently does little for the well being of the
white working class, even as it is protected-i.e., it reaps
some benefit from white privilege-and might live better
than all the others.113
Less visible in this status-based understanding of the
white working class' interests is the notion that both the
lives of white working class people and the lives of working
people across racial, ethnic and gender lines might all be
better served if they struggled together on an anti-racist,
anti-sexist basis and on the basis of equality, thereby
increasing their numbers and power and thereby potentially
expanding their control over material resources. 114
Blindness is perpetuated here because status is unrelated to
the wealth or poverty of other economic classes but is
related to race such that an increase in the economic status
of one racialized group is a decrease in the status of the
other. Nor is there room in this status understanding of
class for the idea that grouping the white working class
with more economically powerful elite whites might mean
that working class issues go unaddressed, in part, because
it is not in the immediate economic interest of elite whites
to improve working conditions for anybody, including the
white working class. 115 Ideologically, then, the conflation of
class and race at the intersection of both blinds society to
112. Id.
113. The question here, as with the points that follow, is that both things
may be true and in contradiction to some extent. Poor whites likely reap some
marginal benefit from racism. At the same time they might reap some benefit,
the bet is more, from class solidarity where they might, with others, effect
change in the economy.
114. Here one might question why an anti-racist or pro-feminist position
might be necessary given the potential development of worker's identities. As a
practical matter, it is not clear a worker identity will hold where there is
strident racism and sexism. As a theoretical matter, blacks and whites, for
example, are not socially situated in the same position, such that racial
solidarity among blacks might serve the larger multiracial group in a way that
white solidarity does not given the history of race relations in the U.S.
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goals and opportunities of class solidarity as opposed to
white racial solidarity. A relational class understanding, in
contra-distinction to this, de-naturalizes white attachment
to white privilege rendering it more variable; it makes
economic privilege and power more apparent, and it makes
the possibility of class solidarity more possible.
CONCLUSION
What emerged from the conference was a shared
intuition that economic inequality was not only perpetuated
by the ways society structures the production and allocation
of resources but that it in part was accomplished by creating
a certain blindness to these structures. For example,
naturalizing the market through discussions primarily
about supply and demand in terms of allocation blinds
people to issues of what is produced, who decides, and why.
This also entails certain blindness to the economic privilege
and power of some to effectuate particular types of
production and allocations that primarily serve their
economic interests. Further, this blindness is embedded in
law through its adherence to formal equality, making it easy
not only to relegate both those who are economically
powerful and the poor to sleep under bridges-same
treatment-but to do so without recognizing that precisely
because the economically powerful are rich and powerful that
they will not have to sleep under the bridge. In addition,
ignoring the impact of those with power likely also cements
and enlarges these privileges, increasing economic inequality,
in part by blocking a fuller analysis of the problems.
The group, therefore, embraced a class-aware
approach, but one that was critical. It also suggested that
class relations, and not simply class status, was important
to the exploration of law and economic inequality. It did so,
on the basis of past work, shared assumptions, and the
workshop discussions. It similarly found that an
intersectional analysis of the ways class relations mutually
shape and are shaped by race and gender status were
important to understanding what were readily observable
phenomena; namely, that racial systems have class as well
as gender components and that gender processes are both
raced and classed. In analyzing these distinct systems, and
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the way they intersect, the ClassCrits project hopes not only
to explain social reality in a way that better reflects its
operation and to make visible some blind spots, but also to
contribute to change, solidarity, and better policies.
The essays that follow spring from our work and our
discussions. They examine these and other ideas from a
number of different perspectives and angles. Though they
do not yet form a systematic body of work, they represent a
hunch that there is more to the phenomenon of increasing
economic inequality than supply and demand.

